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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, a
body corporate and politic,
PlaintiffAppellant,

:

:
Case No. 14190

vs.

:

SALT LAKE COUNTY,
DefendantRespondent,

:
:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, University of Utah, appeals the order granting
summary judgment on behalf of Salt Lake County against the plaintiff-appellant University of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court of the Third Judicial District, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, J r . , Judge, granted the motion for
summary judgment brought by defendant Salt Lake County.

The

summary judgment was that the plaint iff-appellant University of
Utah had no cause of action against the defendant-respondent Salt
Lake County. Judge Hanson ruled as a matter of law that the property subject to the litigation was subject to property taxes by Salt
Lake County.
-1-

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this court reversing the judgment of the Third District Court in this case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaint iff-appellant is a body corporate and politic organized under the laws of the state of Utah. On October 28, 1970 |the
University of Utah entered into a lease-purchase agreement with
Picker X-Ray, one of the defendants below.

(Plaintiff's complaint-

Exhibit A . ) On December 17, 1970 and October 19, 1971 addehda
to the agreement of October 28, 1972 were made and entered into
between the University of Utah and Picker X-Ray (Exhibits B and C
of plaintiff1 s complaint, respectively).

That the equipment was de-

livered by Picker X-Ray to the University of Utah, installed ax the
University of Utah Hospital, and used in conjunction with the exempt
purposes of the University of Utah College of Medicine and Hojspital
is not in dispute.
Salt Lake County invoiced Picker X-Ray for personal property taxes on the equipment subject to the l e a s e for 1972 in th
amount of $5, 391. 97, 1973 in the amount of $4, 745. 32, and 1^74
in the amount of $2,798.87; for an aggregate of $12, 936.16.
(Counterclaim of Picker X-Ray, paragraph 9.) The a s s e s s m e n t s
for 1972 and subsequent years were paid by Picker X-Ray and the
amount of the assessments was billed to the University of Ut^h by
-2-

Picker X-Ray (Counterclaim of Picker X-Ray, paragraph 12.)
According to the addendum dated December 17, 1970
(plaintiffs complaint, Exhibit B), the University of Utah had
the opportunity at the termination of the five-year lease period
to either continue leasing the equipment at the cost of $30, 864. 96
per year or to purchase the equipment at the cost of $38, 581. 20.
It has always been the intent of the University of Utah to purchase
the equipment and to use the lease-purchase arrangement as a
form of financing arrangement necessitated by budgetary considerations.

(Affidavit of Raymond E# Bowden.)

According to paragraph 5 of the lease agreement dated October 28, 1970, the University of Utah is obligated to pay all taxes,
assessment and governmental charges levied or assessed on the
equipment except for taxes based on the net income of the l e s s o r .
According to the lease-purchase agreement and the addenda
the University obtained physicial control and custody of the equipment, the obligation to insure and protect the equipment against
loss, the sole obligation to maintain and repair the equipment, the
obligation to bear the liability of prospective, consequential or s p e cial damages, economic loss or damage resulting from loss of use
of the equipment, the right to have the day-to-day control over the
nature and extent and use of the equipment, the obligation to bear
all responsibility arising out of the use of the equipment , to use
-3-

the equipment as many hours of the day or week as the lessee
in its sole discretion shall determine, and in general to have
all of the indicia of ownership not inconsistent with the security
interests of the seller, Picker X-Ray.

The addendum of De-

cember .17, 1970 (Exhibit B, Plaintiffs Complaint) specifically
provides that through the lease purchase contract no general
obligation is created against the State of Utah and in the event
funding is not sufficient to complete the purchase,

the State

of Utah and the University of Utah a r e absolved from further
liability and the lessor will remove the equipment from the
p r e m i s e s of the University of Utah.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROPERTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH IS
EXEMPT FROM TAXATION PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS
OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES.
Article 13, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution provides
for the exemption from tax of personal property under certaija
conditions. This section states in part:
. . . The property of the state,
counties, cities, towns, school districts,
municipal corporations and public l i b r a r i e s , lots-with the buildings thereon used
exclusively for either religious worship
or charitable purposes, . . . shall be
exempt from taxation . . .
The Utah Code Ann. Section 59-2-30 clarifies the scope
of exemption of Section 2 of Article XIII of the Utah State Consti-4-

tution. The requirements for exemption under this section a r e
as follows:
(1) The user is not organized to p r o duce a profit from the use of the property.
(2) No part of any net earnings, from
the use of the property, inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual, but
any net earnings shall be used directly or indirectly, for the charitable or religious purposes of the organization.
(3) The property is not used or operated by the organization or other person so as
to benefit any officer, trustee, director, s h a r e holder, lessor, member, employee, contributor, or any other person through the distribution of profits, payment of excessive charges
or compensations.
(4) Upon the liquidiation, dissolution,
or abandonment of the user no part of any p r o ceeds derived from such use will inure to the
benefit of any private person.
F u r t h e r m o r e , Utah Code Annotated 53-48-18 makes p e r fectly clear the status of state institutions of higher education with
respect to Article XIII, Section 2 of the Constitution:
The property of the institutions governed by the board shall be exempt from all
taxes and a s s e s s m e n t s .
Clearly, the appellant University of Utah is a sub-division
or institution of the State of Utah within the meaning of Article XIII,
Section 2 of the Constitution and the property of the University is
exempt from taxation by virtue of this section and Utah Code Ann.
Sections 59-48-18 and 59-2-3. Just as clearly, the equipment in
question has been used in furtherance of the exempt purposes of
the University of Utah. This fact has not been disputed at any
-5-

point by the respondent, Salt Lake County/
POINT II
THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE LEASE-PURCHASE
AGREEMENT AND ADDENDA IS THE "PROPERTY OFff THE
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTA]
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES.
According to the lease of October 28,, 1970 and the addenda thereto, the University acquired free and unfettered usd
of the equipment which was the subject of the l e a s e . The only
restrictions placed on the University 1 s use of the equipment were
that lease payments had to be made., the equipment had to be used
in carrying out the purposes of the University Hospital and College
of Medicine, and other nominal restrictions of the lease.

Further-

m o r e , the University of Utah acquired the right to purchase the
equipment at the termination of the lease period for the amount of
$38,581.20.
To qualify for exemption, the property in question mufet be
the n property oft! the exempt organization, in this case the S t p e of
Utah and the University of Utah. T h e r e appear to be various Iconstructions that can be given to the statutory words "property of".
In arriving at the appropriate construction, it is necessary to r e view the legislative intent and rules of construction generallyf applicable to tax exemptions.
F r o m the language of Article XIII Section 2 it is cleaif that
-

V
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the Legislature in proposing the language of the section contemplated that the phrase n property ofn means something different
than ownership. Why else would the language of other portions
of this section refer specifically to ownership?
Clearly, the legislative intent in providing for tax exemptions for both private and public non-profit organizations is to
foster and encourage the charitable activities of the various entities and organizations.

It is a general rule of construction with

non-governmental exempt organizations that exemption from taxation is not favored and is to be strictly construed.

(See for ex-

ample People ex reL Unity Congregational Society vs. Mills, 189
Mis. 774, 71 NYS 2nd 873 (1947).)
This general rule of construction does not apply however
when the exemption is sought by a public entity such as a municipality, the State, or an agency of the State such as the University
of Utah in the instant case. The rule of construction with respect
to publicly-owned property is clearly set forth in the case of Cheyenne v s . Board of County Commissioners, 484 P . 2nd 706 (1971,
Wyoming). In this case, the court discussed the rule of construction with respect to exemptions for publicly-held property and said
the following:
. . . where the established policy of
the state is to exempt publicly-owned property
the view that provisions of the constitution and
statute must be strictly construed does not a p ply nor does the view apply . . . that taxation
-7-

is the rule and exemption must be presumed.
The opposite is true . . . the burden is on
the taxing authority to establish taxability.
(484 P . 2nd at .708-9)
In addition to the rule of construction set forth in the CJheyenne case, the over-riding interpretation to be given by the Supreme
Court should be that which most accurately reflects the legislative
intent.

The clear and unequivocal legislative intent is to prohibit

the taxing of one governmental entity by another and thus eliminate
the resultant confusion and inequities. In light of the rules ofI interpretation and the clear legislative intent the language "property of"
should be interpreted as requiring the control of the exempt organization and not all of the indicia of legal t i t l e /
Even in those jurisdictions where the statutory or constitutional exemption of property requires that it be "owned by" the exempt organization, the courts have consistently looked beyond the
m e r e fact of technical legal title and have carefully examined 1 the
various indicia of ownership such as physical control, extent .of use,
opportunity and likelihood of acquisition of absolute title, etc]

Typi-

cal of these cases is Mitchell Aero, Inc. vs. Milwaukee, 42 Wis.
2nd 656,168 Northwest 2nd 183 (1969). In this case the courtj evaluated whether or not privately constructed buildings on public land
should be subject to taxation.

In making its evaluation, the qourt

likened ownership to a bundle of sticks or rights where one or m o r e
of the sticks may be separated from the bundle and the bundl^ would
-8-

still be considered as ownership. In this particular case, the court
ignored the holding of legal title as being determinative of ownership
and ruled instead that the substance of the transaction was that the
party having the day-to-day physical control, use and benefit of the
property was the owner for purposes of determining tax exemption.
A further illustration of the predominant pattern of examining the substance of a transaction rather than its m e r e legal form
is found in the case of Broadway & Fourth Avenue Realty Company
v s . Louisville, 303 Kentucky 202, 197 S. W. 2nd 238 (1946). In
this case, the court reviewed a long-term lease and held that the
status of the lease holder, rather than the legal title holder, should
be determinative of whether or not a tax exemption should be allowed.
In the Broadway & Fourth Avenue Realty Company case, as in the instant case, the primary indicia of ownership were in the lease holder
with the only elements of ownership being retained by the lessor being
the legal title and the security interest represented thereby.
Because of its failure to examine the n bundle of sticks 11 making
up the ownership of the property subject to the lease purchase a g r e e ment in the instant case, the District Court clearly committed e r r o r .
This e r r o r is compounded by the fact that the examination of the "bundle of sticks" should have resulted in the ruling that as a matter of law
the property subject to the agreement is the property of the University
of Utah and should therefore be exempt from taxation.
The basic considerations of the University of Utah in entering
-9-

into the lease-purchase agreement were clearly those of providing
the greatest possible benefit to the State. Through this purchase
arrangement a general obligation has not been created against t h e
State of Utah. Such an obligation may be in default if funding tco
complete this transaction involving more than a quarter of a raillion dollars of medical equipment is not forthcoming either frcrai
the legislature, the Federal government or other s o u r c e s .

The

protection afforded to the State through making a purchase in this
form is to limit exposure to damages and liability beyond the value
of the equipment if for some unforeseen reason the purchase cannot be completed.

Under a normal sales contract, which would

clearly exempt the property from taxation, the vendor would be
entitled to normal damages for breach of contract in the event
funding for completion of the contract is not available. Now, for
the benefit obtained for the State of Utah, Salt Lake County has
attempted to exact its pound of flesh in the form of personal pr|<operty taxes. Irrespective of whether taxes a r e reimbursed by the
University of Utah or the cost of equipment is increased to reflect
taxes, the net result to the taxpayers of the State of Utah is the
same.
The lease purchase arrangement under which the property
has been acquired is primarily a security and financing a r r a n g e ment used, in the case of public entities, to facilitate purchases
of significant pieces of equipment and limit exposure to liabililp
-10-

To use the "bundle of sticks 11 analogy, the only stick of any significance retained by the vendor is the security interest in the equipment itself. Surely, the respondent would not contest the tax exemption of the property if the security were in the form specified
by the Utah Uniform Commercial Code (Sections 70A-9-101etseq.)
POINT III
THE ERROR OF THE DISTRICT COURT WAS COMPOUNDED
BY THE COURT'S FAILURE TO APPORTION THE TAX EXEMPTION
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH TO THAT PORTION OF THE OWNERSHIP OF THE EQUIPMENT HELD BY THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH.
In some situations where the indicia of ownership a r e split between an exempt organization and a non-exempt organization the courts,
if the division of ownership results in substantial interests for both o r ganizations, have determined that a portion of the value of the property
is taxable and a portion is tax exempt. This does not appear to be the
case in the instant situation, however, inasmuch as Picker X-Ray has
retained what is virtually only a security interest and paper title.
The early case of Jetton v# University of the South, 208 U. S#
489, 52L.Ed 584, 28 S.Ct. 375 (1908) held that the exemption from
taxes could be apportioned according to the interest in the subject
property held by the exempt organization.

Even if the District Court

was correct in not ruling as a matter of law that the property in question was the property of the University of Utah, or in ruling that evidence should be received to determine which indicia of ownership a r e
-11-

held by the University of Utah and which by Picker X-Ray; theIcourt
clearly erred in not attempting to apportion the tax exemption pf the
University of Utah to that portion of the equipment owned by tlie University, if less than the entirety.
The only portion of the equipment, if any, taxable by SapLt Lake
County is the security interest of Picker X-Ray.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments of facts and law, Appellant respectfully urges that the ruling of the District Court bej reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
THOMAS C. ANDERSON
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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